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CHAPTER III

THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE
A. INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1
signed by 44 of the 86 participating states attending the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva, Switzerland, fro1n
February 24 to April 28, 1958, represents little more than a half-loaf
of accomplishment. A full loaf would have included agreement on
the most important aspect of the territorial sea, its breadth; a more
realistic concept of contiguous zones; and a solution of the coastal
fisheries problem, or at least a separation of that problem from the
question of the territorial sea.
In 23 substantive articles the Convention summarizes the law of
the territorial sea without ever specifying its exact breadth. Although
Section II of the Convention is entitled "Limits of the Territorial
Sea," those limits are expressed in terms so vague and indecisive as
to be almost meaningless :
"The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every
point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the
baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea." 2
The Geneva Conference of 1958 actually lost some ground on this
Inatter as compared 'vith the agreement reached by the International
Lavv Commission in its final articles (1956) .3 The Commission
1

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 52 (1958).
Ibid., Art. 6. Jessup calls this language an "impeccable conclusion" of the
Conference. Jessup, "The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,"
59 Oolu1nbia Law Review 234, 243 (1959). A "meaningless conclusion" would
seem to be somewhat more accurate than Jessup's description. "Impeccable"
means free from fault or error; irreproachably correct. Webster's New International Dictionary 1247 (2d Ed. Unabridged 1944). A statement is hardly free
from fault or error and irreproachably correct which is meaningless.
3
U.N. Doc. A/3159, 4 (1956). Article 3 of the I.L.C. final draft provided in
part, (1) "The Commission recognizes that international practice is not uniform
as regards the delimitation of the territorial sea. (2) The C01nmission considers
that international law does not permit an extension of the territorial sea beyond
twelve miles. (3) The Commission, without taking any decision as to the
2
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had concluded that "international law does not permit an extension
of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles," and by implication at
least had recognized the minimum breadth of three miles. But the
Convention as adopted in 1958 contains no reference either to a suggested maximum or minimum, although the record of the Conference
leaves little doubt that the claims of a few states to a territorial sea
beyond 12 miles find no support by the vast majority of states.
Committee I of the Geneva Conference became hopelessly deadlocked in trying to delimit the territorial sea, even on some compromise proposals by the United Kingdom, 4 Canada,5 the United
States, 6 and other states 7 which would have increased the breadth
breadth of the territorial sea up to that limit, notes on the one hand, that many
States have fixed a breadth greater than three miles and, on the other hand,
that many States do not recognize such a breadth when that of their own territorial sea is less.... "
4
Despite her long adherence to the three-mile limit, the United Kingdom introduced a proposal to extend the territorial sea to six miles. However, it was
a tempered proposal which would not have recognized sovereignty of the coastal
state over the outer three miles since it preserved "existing rights of passage for
aircraft and vessels, including warships, outside three miles." U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 134 (1 April1958).
5
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 77/Rev. 3 (1958). This third revision of the
Canadian proposal gave the coastal state a six mile territorial sea and exclusive
fishing rights in an outer six miles as well. Also see U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/39,
(Annexes) 209-254 for this and other proposals by various states.
6
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 159/Rev. 2 (1958 and U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
13/39, (Annexes) 253 (1958). The essence of the revised U.S. proposal which
came closer than any other to being adopted provided for a territorial sea of six
miles plus a conditional exclusive right to fish in the outer six miles of a twelve
mile zone. The condition gave other nations who had fished in the outer six
miles for a period of five years immediately preceding the signature of this convention (the first proposal of the United States specified a ten-year period) the
rigl:it to continue fishing in said area.
7
Canada, India and Mexico entered a joint proposal which provided for a
1naximum breadth of territorial sea up to six nautical miles, except that if prior
to 24 February 1958 (i.e. the start of the Conference) a state had declared its
territorial sea to be in excess of six miles the breadth was to be so fixed but not
exceeding twelve miles. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/77/Rev. 2 (1958) and U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 13/39/SR. 232 (1958). Previously India and Mexico had joined
in proposing a 12 mile territorial sea (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 79). Colombia also
proposed 12 miles (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 82 & Corr. 1), as did Yugoslavia with
the additional provision that the minimum <;ould not be less than three miles
(A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 135). In addition to Canada, the United States, and the
joint proposal of Canada India and Mexico, the following also proposed six miles
for the territorial sea: United Kingdom (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 134), Italy
(A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 137), Ceylon (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 118) and Sweden
(A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 4). Peru proposed that no limit be specified other than
"reasonable limits" and that the breadth be fixed "preferably by regional agreements" (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 133/Add. 1 & 2).
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from three miles, universally recognized as the m1n1mum and
presently supported by the greatest number of large maritime states
in the world, to six miles.
Although the United States proposal of a six-mile territorial sea
failed by a mere seven votes to get the necessary two-thirds majority
in the plenary session, 8 which was the closest that any proposal on
the breadth of the territorial sea came to passing, it became apparent
at the end of the Conference that further discussions on this crucial
matter 'vould achieve nothing and that the most j-udicious procedure
would be to adopt the half-loaf as provided in the Convention. On
the final day the Conference passed a resolution requesting the General Assembly of the United Nations to consider the advisablity of
convening another conference at a later date for the purpose of attempting to reach agreement on a specific breadth for the territorial
sea. 9 This second conference on the law of the sea has been called
for March, 1960. (See addendum to this chapter regarding the 1960
Conference which failed to reach agreement on a delimitation of the
territorial sea.) Actually it is the third world-wide conference relating to the territorial sea if one counts the ill-fated Hague Conference of 1930 10 at which the 47 states participating were in such
heated disagreement that the conference ended without adopting any
articles on the territorial sea and without a single proposal as to a
specified breadth even being put to a vote. 11
It is unfortunate, and some,vhat ironical, that although the 1958
Conference did not specify a breadth for the territorial sea, which
it should have done, it did specify a breadth (12 miles) for the contiguous zone, which it should not have done. It would have been
wiser to have concluded that a coastal state has the right to exercise
the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations, within reasonable distances from
the coast in contiguous zones beyond the territorial sea. 12
Dean, "U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea," 38 State Dept. Bull. 1110
(1958); Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: "\Vhat Was
Accomplished," 52 A.J.I.L. 607, 614 (1958).
9
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 56 (1958).
10
24 A.J.I.L. 52 (1930) and Supp.1-79, 169-258 (1930).
11
Reeves, "The Codification of the Law of Territorial Waters," 24 A.J.I.L.
486, 492 ( 1930) .
12
Jessup supports this view; Jessup, op. cit., footnote 2 (at 234, 244). The
I.L.C., however, seems to have felt bound (without giving reasons) to the figure
of 12 miles for the contiguous zone as adopted by the Preparatory Committee
of The Hague Codification Conference of 1930. U.N. Doc. A/3159, 40 (1956).
Poland introduced a desirable proposal which eliminated reference to a precise
width of the contiguous zone and also included reference to security, but it
failed. "In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal
8
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When considering the limited rights of control which a coastal
state may exercise in the high seas beyond a territorial sea in order
to prevent violations of certain of its regulations, the test of reasonableness as to area of control is more appropriate than a fixed limit. 13
On the other hand, when a coastal state is exercising sovereignty, as
in the case of its territorial sea, under which it has exclusive and unlimited rights over the waters and airspace above, except for the right
of an overseas state to "innocent passage" on the sea, but not in the
airspace, then the limit of that sovereignty should be both fixed and
narrow. It should be fixed so that all states may know the exact
border separating the sovereign area of the territorial sea from the
free area of the high seas to inclusive use by all states. It should be
narrow in order that the coastal state will encroach as little as possible on the free and unfettered use by all states of the world's greatest
common resource-the high seas.
It would have been more in conformity 'vith state practice and far
more realistic to have framed the article in terms of contiguous zones
because a state's area of control over adjacent high seas may need to
vary depending upon the purpose of the control and upon local and
world conditions at any given time. States do in fact claim the right
to exercise limited control over contiguous zones of high seas of varying widths adjacent to their coasts. 14
A more basic fault of the Conference was the inclusion of the article
on the contiguous zone in the Convention on the Territorial Sea. 15
Since the waters of the contiguous zone are high seas it would have
been more appropriate to have put the contents of this article in the
Convention on the High Seas rather than tacking it on to the 23 substantive articles on the territorial sea. Its inclusion in the Convention on the Territorial Sea creates the danger that the rights of coastal
states in the contiguous zone will be considered more nearly related
to the sovereignty which the state has over its territorial sea than to
the minimum, lin1ited rights of control which actually exist. 16 MoreState may take the measures necessary to prevent and punish infringements
of its customs, fiscal or sanitary regulations, and violations of its security."
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 78 (1958).
13
For Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's oft-cited test of reasonableness in this connection see Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Oranch) 187,234-35 (1804).
14
United Nations Synoptical Table, "T,he Law of the Sea," pamphlet by Society
of Comparative Legal and International Law. 36 (1958).
15
The I.L.C. in its final draft articles ( 1956) had the article on the contiguous zones (No. 66) clearly separated from the articles on the territorial sea
(Nos. 1-25). This separation is preferable to the results achieved by the Geneva
Conference of 1958. U.N. Doc. A/3159, 39 (1956).
16
The United Kingdom and Greece made a similar argument in the plenary
meetings of the Conference but were opposed by Canada and Ukrainian S. S.R.
(U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/38, 69 (1958).)
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over, for the states now claiming a territorial sea of 12 miles, the
limits of said sea and the contiguous zone of 12 miles as provided
in the convention are coextensive, making the contiguous zone meaningless and unnecessary.
An analysis of the Conference record suggests that if the concept
of contiguous zones had not only been separated from the Convention
on the Territorial Sea, but also had been enlarged to include
preferential (or in special cases, exclusive) fishing rights in said
zones, quite apart from the proposals to extend the territorial sea
primarily for the purpose of achieving exclusive fishing rights, it
might have been possible to have retained the three-mile limit for
the territorial sea, or at least to have secured agreement on a six-mile
limit as proposed by the United States, Canada and other participants.
In view of the failure of the Conference to agree upon a fixed
breadth of the territorial sea, what is the present law? The si1nplest
answer, although not an entirely satisfactory one, is that the law
is what it was before .the Geneva Conference: uncertain.
On the one hand, a greater number of states, including most of the
major maritime powers, adhere to the three-mile limit than to any
other single lirnit. 17 The three-mile limit is recognized by nations
responsible for about two-thirds of the world's maritime traffic. 18 On
the other hand, if the customary internationalla'v on this matter is to
be determined by mere numbers of states which claim more than a
three-mile territorial sea (i.e., 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, and even 200 miles) then
it may be argued that the three-mile limit is not the law and one is
left with the not-too-helpful conclusion of the International Law Cornmission that
"The Commission, without taking any decision as to the
breadth o£ the territorial sea up to that limit, (i.e., twelve
miles) notes, on the one hand, that many States have fixed a
breadth greater than three miles and, on the other hand, that
many States do not recognize such a breadth when that of
their own territorial sea is less." 19
17

Sorensen, "The Law of the Sea," International Conciliation, No. 520, at
244 (1958).
18
In the meetings of the First Committee the Canadian delegate said that
the three-mile limit had been recognized by nations responsible for some 80%
of the world's maritime traffic. 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 90 (1958)).
This same percentage was used by the British delegate to the Hague Conference
in 1930 when he said that the limit of three miles was recognized "and adopted
by maritime nations which possess nearly 80% of the effective tonnage of the
world." Reeves, "The Codification of the Law of Territorial Waters," 24
A.J.I.L. 494 ( 1930). As of December 31, 1958, sixty-five per cent is a more accurate figure. "Merchant Fleets of the World," 2-3, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Maritime Administration ( 1958).
19
U.N. Doc. A/3159 Art. 3 (3), 4 (1956).
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After the United States compromise proposal to extend the territorial sea to six miles failed in plenary session to get the necessary
two-thirds vote, Arthur Dean, Chairman of the Delegation, emphasized that the three-mile rule vvas still the established law which could
only be changed by agreement. 20 Similarly, the United l(ingdom delegate made a statement confirming the continued existence of the threemile limit as the only breadth recognized under international la vv. 21
By contrast, Professor Tunkin, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation,
vvas equally convinced that "the three-mile limit is not and never has
been a generally recognized rule in the law of the sea." 22
While it is true that in recent years the world has vvitnessed an
increasing ntunber of claims by coastal states to a wider territorial
sea,Z 3 the long history of state practice by the principal maritime
states supports the conclusion that the three-n1ile limit still more
nearly represents customary internationa.lla w than any other figure. 24
Certainly this minimlun breadth of territorial sea represents the most
rational preference viewed from the perspective of the world comInunity for achieving the maximum utilization of the high seas. 25
What are the prospects for reaching agreement on a specific
breadth of territorial sea at a future United Nations Conference?
The ans·wer to this important question depende upon a number of
factors, some of vvhich are unrelated to the basic question of the
20

Dean "U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea," op cit., footnote 8 (at 574).
Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished,"
op. cit., footnote 8 (at 607, 616). Said Mr. Dean, "The fact that a two-thirds
vote could not be obtained in favor of the three-mile limit shows merely a desire on the part of many nations to extend their territorial sea, not that such
an extension in international law has been accomplished." (Ibid., at 616.)
21
Report, First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Misc. No.
15, 6 ~London, 1959). Also see U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/SR. 584 (1958).
22
Tunkin, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea," International
Affairs 47, 48 (Moscow, 1958) ; 2 Official Records (A/OONF. 13/38, 37 (1958)).
23
MacChesney, U.S. Naval War College International Law Situation and
DocumentB-1956 401-501 (1957) ; Oda, "New Trends in the Regime of the
Seas," 18 Zeitschrift Filr Auslandisches ofjentlisches Recht und Vollcerrecht
61-87 (1957).
24
See generally, Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jttrisdiction 76 (1927). The Sovereignty of the Sea (1911) ; Crocker, Extent of the
Marginal Sea (1919) ; Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries Under International Law (1942) ; Higgins and Colombos; International Law of the Sea
(2d Ed. 1951). For a recent statement which confirms the validity of the
three-mile rule until the present century, but suggests that state claims to a
wider territorial sea have caused the rule to "melt away," see Garcia-Ainador,
'l'he Exploitation and Conservation of the Resources of the Sea 26-28 (1959).
25
McDougal & Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives
Versus National E,goism," 67 Yale Law Journal 539, 584 fn 154 (1958) (at 539).
607631--~61--7
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values at stake in reconciling the competing clai1ns to inclusive and
exclusive uses 26 of the total resources of the sea.
One of the most striking illustrations o:f the burdens 'vhich an extension o:f the territorial sea :from three to six miles (or to twelve miles)
"\vould place upon the :freedom o:f the seas is the :fact that of more than
100 important international straits 'vhich are now high seas, more than
fifty would be reduced to territorial seas if the six-mile rule replaced
the three-mile rule, and all would become territorial 'vaters under a
twelve-mile rule. For example, it has been pointed out in the case of
26

The tern1s "inclusive and exclusive uses" are used here in the san1e sense as
used by McDougal & Burke to whom an indebtedness is acknowledged. They
have written :
"By an exclusive claim is meant a claim to authority over an area or over
specified activities which other states cannot share with the claimant state (the
category of authority state A gets, state B cannot get). By such a claim, the
claimant state commonly. asserts a cOinpetence to apply its authority to all
persons in an area or engaged in certain specified activities, irrespective of the
nationality of the person. Examples n1ay be noted in the claims coastal states
make for control over 'internal waters' and 'territorial sea'.
"By an inclusive claim is meant a claim to authority over an area or over
specified activitites which the claimant state can, by some accommodation to
avoid physical interference in use, share with another (the category of authority
state A gets, state B can also get). By such a claim, the claimant state commonly asserts a cOinpetence to apply its authority only to its own nationals.
concedes a comparable authority with respect to the area or activities to other
states with respect to their nationals and demands that other states reciprocally
refrain from the exercise of authority over its nationals and their activities in
the area. Examples may be noted in the claims states Inake to navigation and
fishing on the high seas."
lVIcDougal and Burke, Ibid. It should be emphasized, of course, that even
so-called exclusive uses are subject to accommodation with other uses. For
example, a coastal state's sovereignty (i.e., the right of exclusive use) over its
territorial sea is subject to the right of innocent passage (i.e., overseas states
must be accomrrwdated by permitting them to navigate through the territorial
sea under certain conditions such as innocent passage). But the duty of accommodation in the case of the exclusive use is different from the less than
in the case of inclusive uses. For example, the right of innocent passage may
be limited by reasonable rules, and in some cases suspended if the coastal
state, in a ·sense the domJinant user, feels its security is jeopardized. By
contrast, in the case of inclusive uses, the duty of accommodation is equally
strong among all parties since no one user is dominant per se. Hence, an inclusive user must accommodate all other users on the high seas. Each has ·
equal access to the high seas for navigation, fishing, scientific investigation,
cable laying, etc. Despite these refinements, and others which con1e into play
in connection with safety zones around continental shelf installations, fisheries
conservation zones, and "limited-exclusive-use" areas of the high seas for special purposes such as weapons testing in restricted zones nor1nally open for
inclusive use by all states, the simple formulation of exclusive use and inclusive
use by McDougal and Burke is adequate to describe the two major types of
competing claimants to the resources of the seas.
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the Straits of Gibraltar that if the territor ial sea is extended to s1x
1niles, the ent ire strait \viii become a territorial sea \vith no area of high
seas remaining. 27
\Vhile it can be argued that all states will st ill have the right of
innocent passage through such international straits fron1 one part of
the high seas to another under the Oorfu Channel Oase,28 and under
provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 29 the fact ren1ains that the right of innocent passage is often
viewed as a limited right subject to t he "laws and r egulations enacted
by the coastal state" 30 and subject in special circumstances to temporary suspension. 31 Moreover, one of the greatest burdens which the
transformation of high seas into territorial seas in 1n ore than 100 international straits would impose upon all states of the \Vorld, coastal and
non-coastal, is to preclude the right to fly over the areas. Airspace
over the territorial sea does not afford the right of "innocent passage,"
1neaning that states which now fly over the high seas of t hese international straits would be burdened by having to request permission of the
coastal states to do so, or fly more circuitous, and therefore more costly,
routes. 32

B. COASTAL FISHERIES AND T'HE TERRITORIAL SEA
Basically the coastal fisheries proble1n is an economic struggle between two sets of competing claimant states: those w·hich may be
described generally as "coastal fishing states" such as Canada, Iceland, and a number of Latin American states, and the "overseas fishing states" such as the United States, the United l{ingdom, Japan,
and the Netherlands.
The coastal fishing states \vant exclusive fishing off their coasts
for a distance of 12 miles or more. By contrast, the overseas fishing
states want a narro\v exclusive fishing belt of only three miles, or at
most six miles, in order that their fishing fleets may fish near the
coasts of other states. Of course, some states such as the U nited
States, the United l{ingdom, Japan, and the Netherlands are both
ooastal fishing and overseas fishing states. Yet, despite this dual
27

Dean, U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, op. cit., footnote 8 (at 574, 579) .
[1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
29
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52, Art. 16(4) (1958). It should be noted that
the Convention goes beyond the decision in the Corfu Channel Case in that the
Convention provides for passage fron1 one part of the high seas to another
part of the high seas or th e territorial sea of a foreign State. (Emphasis added.)
The decision was limited to passage between two parts of the high seas.
30
Ibid., Art. 17.
31
Ibid., Art. 18.
32
See the cogent arguments of the United Kingdom delegate in the First
Committee. 3 Official Record.'S ( A/CONF.13/39, 104 ( 1958) ) .
28
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fishing interest, these states are primarily overseas fishing states.
They are also important maritime powers and therefore have long
championed a narrow territorial sea of three n1iles in the over-all
interest o£ the maxlin urn freedom of the high seas.
It should be emphasized that not all coastal fishing states necessarily want a twelve-mile (or wider) territorial sea; indeed some
would prefer not to have it if there were another way to achieve an
extended area of exclusive coastal fisheries. For example, Canada has
:favored a three-mile territorial sea for a number of years even though
she is a coastal fishing state. In one of her early proposals in the First
Committee of the 1958 Conference, Canada advocated a three-mile
territorial sea, accompanied by a provision for exclusive fishing rights
in the outer nine miles of a twelve-mile contiguous zone.33 In a subsequent revision Canada proposed a six-mile territorial sea plus exclusive fishing rights in the outer six miles of the contiguous zone.
The Canadian proposals, as well as those of the United States and
other countries, indicate· rather clearly the extent to which the coastal
fisheries problem dominated the discussions on the territorial sea. In
a report on the Geneva Conference to the Canadian House of Commons, Hamilton indicated the ambivalent attitude of the Canadian
delegation,
". . . our dilemma was, how could we reconcile the defense
interests, freedom of the seas and the freedom of the air,
which really requires a very narrow territorial sea, and the
needs of our people on our coasts for some priority in
harvesting fish off their shores ~" 34
The willingness of some states at the Conference to sacrifice the
larger, more important values of security, freedom of the seas and
:freedom of the air, in order to gain exclusive fishing rights in an
expanded territorial sea, was not only highly questionable but
unnecessary.
It was questionable in terms of values: from the perspective of
the world community of states the value of exclusive rights to a few
million tons of fish are not worth the burdens to security and maximum freedom of the seas and the air which would result from an
extension of the territorial sea.
It was unnecessary because the -~quintessence of the solution, which
seems to have been buried at the Conference under a multitude of
irrelevant arguments, is that it is npt essential to extend the territorial
~.• -5\4,1!'

83
34

U ..N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.1/L. 77/Rev.1 (1958).
8 External Affairs (Aug. 1958).
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sea beyond the present three-mile limit in order to grant the coastal
state preferential, or, in exceptional cases, exclusive fishing rights withinlimited areas beyond the territorial sea, vvhenever it is decided that
this is desirable.
The coastal fisheries problem could have been solved quite apart fro1n
a blanket extension of the costal state's sovereignty over the territorial
sea by expanding the concept of the contiguous zones to include not
only the limited rights of protection of a coastal state against violations of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations, and
security, but also to provide varying degrees of preferential fishing
rights, and, in a few cases exclusive fishing rights where the special
circumstances seem to justify them.
It is true, of course, that the First Committee of the Conference did
attempt to solve the coastal fisheries problem, but it did so in a 1nanner
which kept fisheries tied to the breadth of the territorial sea with the
result that the proposal was defeated in plenary session.
The First Committee adopted a special article (Art. 3) as part of
the articles on the Territorial Sea which provided exclusive fishing
rights to the coastal state in a 12-mile zone. The proposed article read,
"A State has a fishing zone contiguous to its territorial sea
extending to a limit twelve nautical miles from the baseline
from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured in
which it has the same rights in respect of fishing and the exploitation of the living resources of the sea as it has in its
territorial sea." 35
Ostensibly this proposal has no bearing upon the breadth of the
territorial sea which, presumably, could have been kept at the present
three miles or could have been increased to six miles or to some other
figure. However, the discussions leading up to the adoption of the
proposal in the First Committee, and to its defeat in the plenary meetings, make it clear that it was bound inextricably with the question of
the breadth of the territorial sea. In fact, it was voted upon in the
fourteenth plenary meeting just prior to the vote on the United States
compromise proposal for a six-mile territorial sea with exclusive fishing rights in the outer six miles except for historic rights, and similar
proposals relating to the breadth of the territorial sea. 36
The 12-mile exclusive fishing zone article failed to get the necessary
two-thirds vote in plenary meetings, with 35 votes in favor, 30 against,
35

86

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 168/Add. 1, Annex (1958).
3 O,f/icial Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 39 (1958)).
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aud 20 abstentions. 37 From an analysis of the vote one may conclude
as follows: First, the states in favor of the 12-mile exclusive fishing
zone were, for the most part, coastal fishing states, such as Canada,
Iceland, the Philippines, l{orea , and a number of Latin American
states, including all of those which have claimed 200-mile exclusive
fishing rights off their coasts.
Second, the states opposing the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone were
predominantly the overseas fishing states, such as the United States,
the United J(ingdom, Japan, and the Netherlands. A~ supporters of
the three-1nile limit for the territorial sea, these states \Vere no doubt
apprehensive that this was a strong entering \Vedge for the outright
extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles, as \vell as being an un warranted deprivation of their long-standing fishing rights.
Third, the states abstaining were predominantly the Soviet bloc.
Since Russia and her maritime satellites now claim a 12-mile territorial
sea, \vhich, of course, includes the right of exclusive fishing, they
apparently saw no reason to vote on the proposal. One could speculate
as to other possible reasons \vhy the Soviet bloc abstained. A vote
against the proposal would have put them uncomfortably on the side
of the United States, the United J(ingdom, and other states in the
Free vVorld bloc. On the other hand, a vote in favor of the 12-mile
exclusive fishing zone proposal could have been used against them in
their claims that customary international law supports a 12-mile territorial sea because the \Vording of the fishing zone article clearly
i1nplies that the breadth of the territorial sea is something less than
12 miles. 38
37

Ibid. The vote in plenary me·etings on the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone
article was as follows :
For: Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.
Against: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Union of South Africa,
United Kingdom, United States.
Abstain,i ng: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Holy See, Hungary, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Federation of Malaya, Norway, Romania, Switz·erland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.,
Republic of Viet-Nam.
38
The fishing zone article adopted by the First Com1nittee provides : "A State
has a fishing zone contiguous to its territorial sea extending to a limit twelve
nautical miles from the baseline frmn which the breadth of its territorial sea
is measured in which it has the same rights in respect of fishing and the ex-
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C. THE UNITED STATES COMPROMISE PROPOSAL
Im1nediately after the defeat of the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone
proposal, the United States compromise proposal for a six-mile territorial sea with an additional six-mile zone for exclusive fishing except for "historic rights" based upon prior fishing in the area for five
years 'vas put to a vote.
Since it came closest ('vi thin 7 votes) to adoption of any of the
compro1nise proposals, it is desirable to exan1ine it and to analyze the
vote thereon.
The United States compromise proposal provided:
"1. The maximum breadth of the territorial sea of any state
shall be six miles.
2. The coastal state shall in a zone having a maximu1n
breadth of t'velve miles, measured from the applicable baseline, determined as provided in these rules, have the same
rights in respect of fishing and the exploitation of the living
resources o£ the sea as it has in its territorial sea; provided
that such rights shall be subject to the right of the vessels of
any state whose vessels have fished regularly in that portion
of the zone having a continuous baseline and located in the
same major body of 'vater for the period of five years immediately preceding the signature of this Convention, to fish
in the outer six miles of that portion of the zone, under obligation to observe therein such conservation regulations as are
consistent ·with rules on fisheries adopted by this Conference
and other rules of international law.
3. Any dispute 'vith respect to the interpretation or
application of this article shall, at the request of any party
to the dispute, be submitted to arbitration unless the parties
- agree to another method of peaceful solution.
4. For the purposes of this Convention the term 'mile'
1neans a nautical mile ( 'vhich is 1,852 meters), reckoned at
sixty to one degree of latitude.
5. As respects the parties thereto, the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article shall be subject to such bilateral or
multilateral arrangements, if any, as may exist or be entered
into.
ploitation of the living resources of the sea ds it has in its territorial sea"
(A/OONF. 13/0. 1/L. 168/Add. 1, Annex (Emphasis added) ) . If the territorial
sea, which includes the right of exclusive fishing, were not to be considered less
than twelve miles, then there would be no need to provide for an exclusive fishing zone of 12 miles. Hence, the article clearly implies that the territorial sea
is conHidered to ue somewhat less than the 12-mile fishing zone.
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Note: It is proposed that this article be entered into with
the express understanding that each party to the Convention
undertakes to consider sympathetically the request of another
party to consult on the question of whether the rights granted
by this article are being exercised in such n1anner as to \York
an inequity upon one or more of the other parties and, if so,
'vhat measures should and can be taken to remedy the
situation." 39
The proposal received the following votes:
For (45):
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Ceylon,
China, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, India, Iran, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaya, Monaco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdon1,
United States, Viet-Nam.
Against ( 33) :
Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Burn1a, Byelorussia, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Jordan, l{orea,
Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Poland,
Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., U.A.R.,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.
Abstain (7) :
Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Finland, Iraq, Japan, Nepal,
Philippines.
States voting against the United States compromise proposal may be
divided into five general categories. The figure or infor1nation in
parentheses indicates the clain1 to territorial sea and in some cases the
special limits claimed for fishing. 40
SOVIET BLOC. (10 votes) :
Albania (10)
Bulgaria ( 12)
Byelorussia (none specified but a Soviet Union republic)
Czechoslovakia (not specified but dominated by U.S.S.R. even
though technically an independent state)
Hungary (12)
39
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Poland (3 in 1940, but do1ninated by U.S.S.R. even though technically an independent state)
Romania ( 12)
Ukraine (none specified but a Soviet Union republic)
U.S.S.R. (12)
Yugoslavia ( 6, plus 10 n1iles for fishing)
This so-called Soviet bloc includes a variety of hedfello\vs. On
the one hand, Byelorussia and Ukraine are Soviet Union republics
and hence actual parts of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Constitution
requires that their foreign policy be coordinated by Moscow. The
others are technically independent states, but their foreign policy
and internal affairs ar,e dominated in varying degrees by the

U.S.S.R.
LATIN AMERICAN STATES

(11 votes) :
Argentina (sea above continental shelf, limit unspecified)
Chile (200)
Colombia ( 6 in 1930)
Ecuador (36) (claim is only 12 miles but reckoned at 20-to-1,
which is three times usual nautical mile)
El Salvador (200)
Gua tern ala ( 12)
Mexico (9)
Panama (sea above continental shelf, limit unspecified)
Peru (200)
Uruguay (6)
Venezuela ( 12)
ARAB STATES (7 votes):
Jordan (3 in 1956)
Lebanon ( 6, fishing only)
~ Libya (12)
Morocco ( 6, fishing only)
Saudi Arabia (12)
Tunisia ( 3, but special limit for fishing to depth of 50 meters)
United Arab Republic (12)
ASIATIC STATES (3 votes) :
Burma (none specified)
Indonesia ( 12)
Korea ( 50-60 for fishing)
OTHERS (2 votes) :
Canada ( 3, with speciallirr1it of 12 claimed for fishing)
Iceland ( 4 in 1935 for fishing only, now claims 12)
If one attempts to analyze the votes of these five groups of states
against the United States compromise proposal in order to appraise
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the prospects of achieving a favorable two-thirds vote on the same or
a similar proposal at a future Conference the results are far £ro1n
encouragn1g.
With respect to the Russian bloc of 10 votes, since all of these states
except Yugoslavia are either committed to a 12-Inile territorial sea
or so do1ninated by the U.S.S.R. that they dare not vote for anything
else, it is not likely that any of these votes ·will change.
It is true that Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito has sp_o,vn considerable independence from Soviet domination. Ho-wever, while she
claims a territorial sea of only six miles as compared \vith the 12-mile
claim of n1ost o£ the Soviet bloc, she has claimed an exclusive fishing
zone of 10 miles since 1950 prin1arily to exclude Italians from fishing
ne,ar the Yugoslav shores in the upper Adriatic Sea \vhere t he fishery
resources close to the Yugoslav coast are much richer than those on
the Italian side. Of course, if the question of the breadth of the territorial sea could be divor<;ed from the question of coastal fisheries, it is
barely possible that Yugoslavia n1ight vote for a six-mile territorial
sea, \V hich she herself no\v proclaims.
Of the eleven Latin American States voting against the United
States compron1ise proposal for a six-mile territorial sea, ony t\voColombia and Uruguay-claim as little as six 1niles.41 All of the
others claim t\velve to t\vo hundred 1niles except Mexico, \vhich clai1ns
nine miles. 42 Colo1nbia's claim to a six-mile territorial sea goes back
to 1930, but she has also clai1ned a 12-mile fishing zone :for much longer
(since 1923) .43
Eleven Latin American States voted for the 12-mile fishing zone in
the plenary 1neetings,44 even though the proposal failed to get the requisite t\vo-thirds majority, indicating their strong desire for a Ininimum exclusive fishing zone of at least that distance. In addition
three of these Latin American States-Colombia, Mexico and V enezuela-joined \Vith five other states in what came to be known as the
eight-po\ver proposal which \vould have pern1itted a coastal state to
fix the territorial sea up to twelve miles and \Vhich \vould have granted
exclusive fishing rights of twelve miles even though the territorial
sea might be proclaimed at less than that distance. 45 This proposal
lost in plenary meetings by a vote of 39 in favor, 38 against, with 8 abstentions.46
41
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It should be emphasized that, although these eleven Latin American
States voted against the United States compromise proposal, as did
the Soviet bloc, they ·were not in any sense subservient to or dominated
by the Soviet bloc. On the contrary, when the Soviet proposal, -vv hich
'vould have granted each state the right to establish a territorial sea
"within the limits, as a rule, of three to twelve miles" with no reference
to exclusive fisheries rights,47 was voted on in the plenary n1eeting
shortly after the defeat of the United States compromise proposal, all
but three of these eleven Latin American states voted in the negative.
Chile, Ecuador and Peru, principal claimants of a 200-mile territorial
sea, voted in favor of the Soviet proposal which was resoundingly defeated by 21 in favor, 47 against with 17 abstentions. 48 However, the
vote of these three Latin American states was not so much a vote in
favor of the Soviet proposal as it was .an affirmation of the position
which they have maintained for several years and which they enunciated again in a three-party declaration near the end of the conference
for "the establishment and extension of a more just regime of the sea
that will safeguard effectively the recog;nized speeial right of the
coastal States to defend their economy and the livelihood of their
populations." 4 &
With one or two possible exceptions, it is doubtful that any of these
eleven Latin American States 'vill change their 1958 vo.tes and in the
future either abstain from voting or vote in favor of a territorial sea
of six miles or less. Again, ho,vever, it should be emphasized that if
the coastal fisheries question could be settled separately from the territorial sea question, it might be possible that several of these states
"\Vould vote for a narrow territorial sea of six miles or less. For exan1ple, the Argentine delegate indicated that his country had voted
in First Committee for a six-mile territorial sea in the hope that a
uniform international rule -vvould result, but that Argentina felt coinpelled to vote against the United States proposal because of its provisions reserving historic fishing rights in the outer six miles. 50
In the case of the seven Arab States which voted against the United
States proposal, the pr~evious tabulation indicates that three now· claim
a territorial sea of 12 miles, two claim six m]les (for fishing only), and
two claim three miles. While there were undoubtedly a number of
reasons why these seven states voted as they did, it seems safe to say
that one of the principal reasons was to prevent Israel from having an
outlet to the "high seas" of the Gulf of Aqaba. Since the Gulf is only
about fifteen miles at its 'videst point, a claim by the littoral Arab states
47
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to territorial seas of 12 miles (or even to nine miles) 'vould mean that
Israel, located at the narrow head of the Bay, would have to traverse
the territorial seas of Arab states for more than 100 miles from her
own port of Elath to reach the high seas of the Red Sea.5 1
While it is true that Israel would have the right of innocent passage
from her port through the territorial seas of the Arab States under
Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 5 2 it would be possible for the Arab States to hinder or even
deny such passage to Israeli ships on the ground that such passage
was not innocent but "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal State." 53
Because of the particular interests of these Arab states in relation
to Israel, coupled with the desire of most of them to extend their territorial seas in order to achieve additional exclusive fishing rights at
least up to twelve miles,54 it is difficult to imagine that more than one
or possibly two will soon change their votes from negative to affirmative on a proposal calling ·for a territorial sea of six miles or less.
One slender reed of encourage1nent in the case o£ Lebanon, which
claims a six-mile territorial sea for fishing only, is the fact that after
voting against the United States compromise proposal, she also voted
against the Soviet proposal 55 which in effect approved the unilateral
establishment of a ,12-mile territorial sea. Moreover, Lebanon
abstained when it came to voting on the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone
article. These facts suggest the possibility that Lebanon might be
51

Of course, Saudi Arabia has taken the position that the Gulf of Aqaba is a
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persuaded to vote for a 6-mile territorial sea which, of course, would
include exclusive fishing in said area, consistent with her present unilateral claim of that distance, if proposals relative to exclusive fishing rights beyond a six-mile territorial sea were treated separately.
The three Asiatic States voting against the United States compromise proposal-Burma, Indonesia, and Korea-all appear to favor
a territorial sea of 12 miles or more, primarily because of strong interests in securing exclusive fishing rights up to this distance or beyond.
All three voted in favor of the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone article
which was adopted by the First Committee.56 Moreover, two of the
three (Burma and Indonesia) voted in :favor of the Soviet proposal
which, as previously indicated, would have approved unilateral claims
to a territorial sea up to twelve miles, thus establishing this figure as
the breadth.
Korea voted against the Soviet proposal, as might have been
predicted in vie'v of her claim in 1952 to broad exclusive fisheries zones
off her coasts and sovereignty over the continental shelf and superjacent waters to a distance of fifty to sixty miles from shore, despite
assertions that the claim did not effect an extension of the territorial
sea.57 Since Japan, with one of the largest fishing fleets in the world,
has long maintained that the three-mile territorial sea is a firmly
established principle of international law, the claims of Korea to
exclusive fishing for the distances claimed have put the two states in
direct conflict.
Here again, if Burma, Indonesia and Korea are to be persuaded to
vote for a territorial sea of six miles or less, the coastal fisheries
problem will have to be resolved.
With respect to Iceland, again we find a close linkage of the territorial sea breadth and the coastal fisheries problem. Although for
approximately two centuries (from 1662 to 1859) Iceland claimed
exclusive fishery limits of 16 miles, in 1901 the Danish and British
Governments entered into an agreement specifying three miles for
fisheries and 10 miles for bays.58 At the Hague Conference in 1930
the delegate from Iceland in an informal expression of views as to
the proper breadth of the territorial sea supported four miles. 59 In
1952 Iceland formally extended her territorial sea for exclusive fishing to four miles, 60 although she has argued in favor of the right to
56
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1nuch greater exclusive fishing in the superjacent waters of her cont inental shelf. 6 1 The 1952 claim to four miles brought a prompt
pr otest from the United Kingdom, including the closing of British
ports t o the landing of fish from Icelandic trawlers. 62
Shortly after the Geneva Conference of 1958 failed to reach agreeInent on the breadth of the territorial sea, Iceland extended her claim
of exclusive fishing rights to twelve miles, without extending her territorial sea as such. This claim met with widespread protest, including that of the U nited ICingdom ·which began protecting her trawlers
'vith naval ships between the four and twelve-mile limits. 63
The coastal fisheries problem of Iceland is unique in that fishing is
such an important part of her economy, more so than in any other
state. Fish constitutes 14% of her total domestic production and 96%
of her total exports. 64 These facts, together with the evidence of overfishing off Iceland's coasts,65 suggest not only the need for conservat ion measures as provided in the Geneva Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 66 but also
the possible need to grant Iceland preferential, or perhaps even exclusive, fishing rights in a limited area of high seas adjacent to her coasts.
A t t he 1958 Conference Iceland introduced the following proposal
t o take care of her special circumstances:
"In exceptional circumstances, where a people is primarily
dependent on its coastal fisheries for its livelihood and/or
economic development, the State concerned has the right to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the fisheries up to the
necessary distance from the coast in view of relevant local
considerations." 67
In the comment which followed this proposal it was suggested by
Iceland that a zone of twelve miles would go a long way toward taking
care of her requirements but that it might be necessary to have an
81
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additional zone beyond t\velve miles in \vhich Iceland \voulJ. hav~.
priority rights. 68
Although the Iceland proposal has considerable merit because of the
importance of fishing to her total economy, it failed to \vin approval
at the Conference. Ho,vever, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the I-Iigh Seas did recognize that the
coastal state has a special interest in the n1aint·enance of the productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to
its territorial sea, 69 and may adopt unilateral measures of conservation
under certain circumstances. 70 The Convention also provides :for
compulsory settlement of disputes \vhich arise over fishing and
conservation. 71
Although Iceland voted against the United States co1npromise proposal of a six-mile territorial sea, 72 she did so primarily because of her
objection to the provision for "historic fishing rights" in the outer
six 1niles of a t\velve-mile zone. Iceland \vants a 12-Inile zone of exclusive fisheries, nothing less. She voted in favor of the 12-mile exclusive fishing provision (Art. 3) of the First Com1nittee, 73 and also
for the Soviet compromise proposal granting approval of a. territorial
sea up to 12 miles. 74
Yet, Iceland has indicated that she \Vould not press for an extension
of the territorial sea beyond three miles, provided she could secure exclusive fishing rights in a t\velve-mile zone. 75 Hence, it may be possible
to win Iceland's vote for a narrow territorial sea of six miles or less
if the coastal fisheries problem can be resolved separately.
The same is true of Canada whose interest in as narrow a territorial
sea as possible, preferably three miles, has been referred to above. But
Canada, like Iceland, wants a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone, 76 even
though the relative importance of fisheries to Canada's total economy
is far less than in the case of Iceland. Canada's sea fishery landings
68
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are less than one per cent of her aggregate do1nestic product, and only
three per cent of her total exports. 77
Here again it seems safe to assert that if the coastal fisheries question could be resolved separately from the question o:f the territorial
sea breadth, Canada would favor a three-mile limit or be "\villing to
compromise on a six-mile limit.
Having analyzed briefly the vote of the 33 states which opposed the
United States proposal to see whether and under what circumstances
some of these states might be persuaded to vote at the 1960 Conference
for a narrow territorial sea of six miles or less, we turn now to a sun1mary consideration of the seven states which abstained from votingAfghanistan, Costa Rica, Finland, Iraq, Japan, Nepal, and the PhilIppines.
It will be observed that two of these states are land-locked-Afghanistan and Nepal. Notwithstanding this fact, they have as great
an interest in the maximum freedom of the seas as do coastal states,
an interest which was recognized in a number of "\Vays at the Conference. For example, a separate committee was established to study
the question of :free access to the sea of land -locked countries, 78 and in
the Convention on the High Seas the list of freedoms is explicitly made
applicable both for coastal and non-coastal States. 79
Although the immediate and paramount interest of land -locked
states tends to center on the matter of overland access through neighboring states to the sea, the representative of Afghanistan appropriately formulated the broad perspective when he said,
"Our life today is interdependent, and all nations 'vhether
maritime or land-locked have built their economic life in such
a way that through the sea they obtain their urgent needs and
requirements. No land-locked country can live alone and be
self-sufficient without relying on sea transportation." 80
Because of the interest of Afghanistan and Nepal as land-locked
states in the maximum freedom of the seas, if other considerations such
as the fear of offending dominant neighboring st3tes which 'vere opposed to the u·nited States proposal could be neutralized, it seems
likely that such states could be persuaded to vote for a narrow territo rial sea, despite the fact that some of these states have indicated
a "cautious attitude" toward the question. 81
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Of the five other abst aining states, Japan has long been an advocate
o:f a three-mile ter ritor ial sea because o£ her overriding interest in the
maximum f reedom of the high seas both for navigation and fishing.
A lthough Japan abstained from voting on the United States proposal,
she did show her willingness to compromise her long-standing adherence to the three-mile limit by voting in the First Committee for
the first hal£ of the Canadian proposal to establish a six- mile limit. 82
But, she voted against the second half of the Canadian proposal which
·would have provided exclusive fishing rights in the outer six miles of
a 12-mile zone. Despite her desire to suppor t the U nited States in
her efforts to achieve agreement on the narrowest possible territ orial
sea, Japan abstained on the United S t ates proposal because she could
not vote for that part which provided exclusive fishing to the coastal
state in the outer six miles of a 12-mile zone except f or "historic r ights"
based upon five years of prior fishing. This provision meant that J apan, and other overseas fishing states, would be forever precluded fro1n
fishing in these exclusive, outer-six-mile zones if they had not fished
there recently (i.e., within the past five years), a crippling prohibition
to Japan's large and vital fishing interests.
Finland has a territorial sea of four miles, a limit "'•vhich she has
favored for many years. 83 It is not easy to account for her abstention
on the United States proposal although one may note her consistency
in abstaining on most of the proposals regarding breadth of the territorial sea. She did so in the First Committee on both parts o£ the
Canadian proposal,84 and in the plenary n1eetings on the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone, 85 the eight-power proposal,86 and the Soviet proposal.87 The Scylla and Charybdis for Finland may well be her :friendship for the United States on the one hand and her physical p roximity
to the Soviet Union on the other. Under these circumstances, the
safest prediction as to her vote on this issue is another abstention, with
an outside chance for a vote in favor of a narrow territ orial sea of six
1niles or less.
Costa Rica, also abstaining on the United States proposal, has followed the lead of Chile, Ecuador and Peru in claiming a n1ar itime zone
82
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of 200 rniles,88 but has emphasized that this claim in no ·way implies
an assertion of a territorial sea of that distance. 8 9 Moreover, during
t he Conference she did not vote consistently ·with those three countries. F or example, although she voted 'vith the1n in favor of the
12-mile exclusive fishing zone,90 she "\Vas opposed to them in voting
against the Soviet proposal authorizing coastal states to establish a
territorial sea at any distance bet,veen three and twelve miles. 91
Costa R ica has described a territorial sea of three miles as an
"anachronism consistent neither 'vith the advances of modern technique nor 'vith methods of exploiting marine resources which have
been employed in the modern world." 92 That the control of coastal
fisheries resources is one of the major concerns of Costa Rica, rather
t han the breadth of the territorial sea as such, is indicated by the
follo,ving assertion:
"What the Government of Costa Rica "\Vants is to secure
the recognition of its competence and jurisdiction to regulate
and control the manner in 'vhich the living resources o:f the
sea are exploited in the n1aritime zones adjacent to its coasts,
lest the abusive exploitation of these resources lead to their
depletion or exhaustion. We consider that Costa Rica, as a
coastal State, has a prior interest in these resources .... " 93
T hus, the Costa Rica position suggests that if the coastal fisheries
p roblem can be resolved separately, she might be persuaded t o vote for
a t erritorial sea of six miles or less.
Iraq has claimed a territorial sea in accordance 'vith international
law without specifying a breadth. Since she voted against the first part
of the Canadian proposal to establish a territorial sea of six miles, 94 and
voted for the eight-po,ver proposal, 95 as "\Vell as the Soviet proposal,96
both of which would have permitted the establishment of a 12-mile
territorial sea, perhaps the most that can be hoped for in a future conference is her abstention on the establishment of a territorial sea of six
n1iles or less, with the remote possibility of a vote for such a proposal.
The Philippines, the last of the seven states abstaining on the United
States compromise proposal for a six-mile territorial sea, claims that
88
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the posi6on of archipelagic nations calls :for special treatlnent. She
introduced a proposal in the First Committee 'vhich would have ap plied the method of straight baselines to archipelagos, as \veil as to
coasts which are deeply indented,97 by permitting the drawing of baselines along the coast of the outermost islands, follo,ving the general
configuration of the group, where the islands are sufficiently close to
one another as to form a eompact \Vhole and have been historically
considered collectively as a single unit. 98
The general statements of the Philippine representative in the General . A.ssembly prior to the Conference to the effect that security and
economic reasons \Varrant an extension of the territorial sea, 99 and her
vote against the first part of the Canadian proposal to establish a sixInile territorial sea 100 and in favor of the 12- mile exclusive fishing zone
proposal, 101 all see1n to suggest that the Philippines cannot be persuaded to vote for a narrow territorial sea of six miles or less unless
the coastal fishing problem is settled separately.
D. SEPARATION OF DELIMITATION OF TERRITORIAL SEA
FROM COASTAL FISHERIES PROBLEM

Suppose the question of the delimitation of the territorial sea
were separated from the question of coastal fisheries, is it likely that
the necessary two-thirds vote could be secured in a future conference
on a six-mile or narrower limit?
This is a difficult question to answer. One might hastily conclude
that agreement on as narrow a limit as six miles, quite apart from the
coastal fisheries question, is doubtful on the basis of the vote in the
First Committee of the 1958 c ·o nference when the first part of the
revised Canadjan proposal calling for a six-mile territorial sea was
resoundingly defeated with only 11 votes in favor, 48 against, with 23
abstentions.102
Yet it should be stressed that the vote on this part of the Canadian
proposal in 1958 was not at all indicative of the general sentiment
of a majority of the states towards compromising on a six-mile territorial sea as demonstrated later in the Conference when the United
States proposal which, like the Canadian proposal, also embodied a
six-mile territorial sea, came within seven votes of achieving the
necessary two-thirds majority. Nor is the vote on th~ first part of the
97
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Canadian proposal in 1958 necessarily indicative of what a future
Conference might vote on a similar delimination of the territorial sea,
especially if the states can be persuaded to treat the matter of delimitation separately from the coastal fisheries problem.
The problem is really two-fold: (1) whether the states will be
disposed to decide the question of the breadth o:£ the territorial sea
separately :from the question of coastal fisheries; and (2) whether
they will agree on a territorial sea o:£ six miles, or less, without first
having arrived at an agreement on the extent of preferential and/or
exclusive fishing rights to be granted to the coastal state in a contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea.
With respect to the second problem, which is the more difficult, the
delegate from Iceland probably expressed the views of a number of
states when he indicated that his delegation had voted against the
first part of the Canadian proposal to establish a six-mile territorial
sea because at that stage in the Conference the coastal state's exclusive
fishing rights up to twelve miles had not yet been voted upon/ 03 indicating an insistence on the settlement of the coastal fisheries problem
first.
Since it is felt by many states that the easiest way to get additional
exclusive fishing rights is to claim an extension of the territorial sea,
not,vithstanding a general recognition of the validity of the pronouncement in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Oase that "the delimitation
of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent
1nerely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal
law," 104 there is a reluctance to agree upon a narrow territorial sea
of six miles or less without first knowing at least what the general pattern of agreement is likely to be with respect to preferential or exclusive coastal fishing rights. Some states, such as Iceland, appear to
demand a specific agreement guaranteeing exclusive fishing to the
coastal state, prior to a determination of the delimitation of the territoria.I sea.
.
Relative to the first problem above of separating the question of the
breadth o:f the territorial sea from the question of coastal fisheries, Mr.
Dean, head of the United States delegation, vigorously opposed a
Canadian motion that the United States proposal be voted on in two
parts, as had been done with the Canadian proposal. He said that
the United States delegation was not prepared to support any proposal
establishing the breadth of the territorial sea at six miles unless it
103
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The Court went on to say, "Although it is true
that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the
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regard to other States depends upon international law."
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included the other essential elements of the proposal 105 (i.e., inclusion
of the "historic rights" provision to insure that the United States and
other overseas fishing states could continue to fish in the outer six-mile
"exclusive" zone). Dean's position undoubtedly reflected the pressures
of certain influential fishing interests, both in the United States and
in other states.
Thus, the voting on the separate question of a six-mile territorial sea
'vas taken on the Canadian proposal in the First Committee at a time
'vhen the United States, one of the leading exponents later in the Conference of a compromise at six miles, and several other states were unwilling to consider the breadth of the territorial sea apart from the
coastal fisheries question. In the interest of achieving the narrowest
possible territorial sea it is hoped that the United States and other
states may ehange their views on this matter. Therein lies the only
hope of avoiding another deadlock such as the one which developed in
the 1958 Conference.
Assuming that a significant number of states will be unwilling to
commit themselves to a narrow territorial sea of six miles or less
'vithout first having some assurance that their demands for preferential and/or exclusive fishing rights in an area beyond a narrow territorial sea will be recognized, (an assumption which seems warranted
in light of the 1958 Conference record), what form might this assurance take without the danger of reaching an impasse over specific
details~

E. SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR HIGH SEAS AND COASTAL
FISHERIES
It is suggested that agreement might be had upon a general stateInent of three complementary principles with respect to high seas and
coastal fisheries, prior to and quite apart from any discussion of the
delimitation of the territorial sea. These principles are as follows:
I. Principle I: Basic Right to Fish on the High Seas
All states have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on
the high seas, subject (a) to their treaty obligations and (b) to principles which have as their purpose the recognition of the special rights
of coastal states to preferential or exclusive fishing rights in lin1ited
areas of the high seas adjacent to their coasts beyond the territorial
sea.
Commentary

This first principle recognizes the freedom of high seas fishing as a
basic, traditional right. It has been incorporated in t~e provisions of
105
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..._1\_rticle 2 of the Convention on the High Seas 106 and Article 1 of the
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas. 107
In the principles which follo,;v, it ·will be seen that this basic, first
principle, long-recognized in International Law, is not absolute but
is subject to certain limitations in order to recognize the desirability
of providing coastal states with (a) preferential fishing rights in
limited areas of the high seas adjacent to their coasts ai~d (b) exclusive
fishing rights in still narrower areas in those exceptional cases in "\vhich
the coastal state is primarily dependent upon its coastal fisheries for
its economic livelihood.
2. Principle II: Preferential Fishing Rights for Coastal States
in Limited Areas

All coastal states have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing in limited areas of the high seas adjacent to their coasts on a
preferential basis subject to the "historic rights" of overseas states
'Nhich have fished in such areas during a designated period immediately preceding the effective date of a Convention on Coastal
Fisheries.
Commentary

The purpose of this second principle is to accord to the coastal state
a preference to fish in a limited area of the high seas adjacent to its
coast while at the same time balancing this preferential treatment 'vith
Principle I which recognizes the traditional rights of all states to fish
in the high seas. The preferential fishing zone contemplated under
this principle would accord overseas fishing states the right to continue fishing for the same classes o£ fish up to an amount not exceeding the average annual catch over a designated prior period of, say,
five or ten years.
In the formulation of the principle of preferential fishing rights
for the coastal state, 'vith due provision for the "historic rights" of
overseas states, it is unnecessary to incorporate 'vithin the principle
itself an exact period of time (i.e., 5 years, 10 years, etc.) as the basis
for determining which states have fished in an area sufficiently long
to have established an "historic right" to continue fishing there, and
for calculating the average annual catch which the overseas state may
not exceed in the future. The details of the time period can be resolved
by agreement later; the first and most important step is to establish
the broad principle.
106
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However, three comments 1nay be of some help in the :future in
detern1ining ·what the ti1ne period should be, assuming that a time
period is used as the basis :for establishing "historic rights." 108
First, it is :felt that the period should not be shorter than five years
because a st ate which has fished in a given area for less than that length
of time can hardly be said to have established "historic fishing rights"
therein. Secondly, since the :facts 1nay sho'v that overseas states do not
fish regularly each year in a given area, it 1nay be that the follo"Ting
type of formula would be :fairer: "historic fishing rights" shall be accorded to any state vvhich has fished in a given coastal area for a certain stock, or stocks, of fish during any five (or seven or eight) years
out of the past ten (or tvvelve or fifteen). Thirdly, it n1ay be some'vhat indicative of the :favorable attitude of n1any states to,vard the
five-year criterion on this question of "historic rights" to remember
that the United States compromise proposal at the Geneva Conference
in 1958, which came within seven votes of adoption, contained a fiveyear period as the basis for determining "historic rights." In an
earlier proposal at the Conference, the United States had suggested a
ten-year period.
\Vhereas in the high seas beyond the preferential fishing zone adj acent to the coasts all states vvould have equal fishing rights, except to
the extent that they may have agreed other,vise under conservation
treaties, within the preferential fishing zone the overseas states 'voulcl
have 1nore lilnited rights and yet 'vould not be subject to con1plete exclusion by the coastal state as would be the case under Principle III
belovv.
The principle of preferential fishing rights vvould make it possible
for the coastal state to increase its catch over the years as the fishing
stocks increased, but the overseas fishing state vvould be restricted to a
maximum tonnage based upon the annual average catch over the
design a ted period.
It will be noted under this principle that the coastal state is granted
preferential rights in three important vvays : ( 1) preference as to an
area, ( 2) preference as to time, and ( 3) preference as to total catch.
( 1) Preference as to an area. Admittedly the granting of preferential fishing rights to the coastal state in an area of .the high seas is a
derogation from the basic, traditional principle of freedom of fishi ng
108
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on the high seas no'v more than three centuries old. 109 However, this
derogation recognizes the emerging demands of coastal states for some'vhat greater fishing rights in their coastal waters founded upon economic and other considerations, without going so far as to destroy a
part of the basic principle of freedom of high seas fishing entirely. It
should be emphasized that most of the recent demands of coastal states
have been for emclusive fishing rights beyond the territorial sea. Many
of these claims to exclusive fishing rights, particularly the ones of the
South .._~merican States claiming sovereignty up to the incredible
200 miles fron1 shore, have no legal, economic, social or moral
j ustification. 110
Also, the for1nulation of the principle of preferential fishing rights
in a limited area of the high seas adjacent to the coastal state is an
attempt to break the impasse which has developed, and which gives
unfortunate promise of continuing, between the coastal states which
demand broad zones of emclusive fishing rights, and the overseas fishing states "\vhich insist upon the absolute freedom of fishing outside of
a three mile territorial sea. Regrettably and yet necessarily the overseas states sometimes feel compelled to enforce such insistence by having "\Varships accompany fishing vessels. 111
This principle "\Vhich recognizes preferential fishing rights for the
coastal state is a n1iddle ground "\vhich, it is hoped, will make it possible for coastal fishing states and overseas fishing states to reach an
equitable compromise of their extreme positions.
(2) Preference as to ti1ne. The coastal state is granted a preference
as to time in that its nationals may fish in the preferential zone for
any class of fish even though they 1nay not have fished there before,
or at least not "\vithin the designated base period which is required
for overseas states in order for them to establish their "historic fishing rights." This time preference may be of great importance to (a)
long-established coastal states which have done little or no fishing
in the preferential zone for particular stocks of fish, and (b) for the
109
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host of emerging ne\v coastal states which ·will be assured of pr1or
rights for their limited, but emerging fisheries industries. 112
( 3) Preference as to total catch. Perhaps the n1ost important
feature of the preferential principle for the coastal state is the opportunity afforded to increase its catch within the preferential zone in
the future, no matter what its catch has been in the past. By contrast,
overseas states ·would have their future catches li1nited both as to
amount and as to a particular class or stock of fish, the li1nit being
determined by the average annual catch over the designated base
period.
In addition, the principle of the preferential fishing zone for coastal
states suggested above would include a recognition of the right of the
coastal state to adopt unilateral conservation measures, pending an
agreement between the various stateB fishing in the preferential zone,
along the lines provided in Article 7 of the Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources o£ the High Seas. 113
It is not proposed that the coastal state 'vould be accorded preferential treatment in the sense of being able to dictate or do1ninate the
establishment of conservation measures. But the coastal state would
be able to act, in case an impasse developed, to conserve stocks of fish
until the matter could be settled by negotiation, arbitration or some
other peaceful means.
Also, it should be noted that the coastal state's preferential rights
might, in exceptional cases, develop into exclusive rights under the
principle enunciated below, although it is not expected that this 'vould
occur in many instances.
3. Principle lll: In Exceptional Cases, Exclusive Fishing Rights
for Coastal States

A coastal state shall have the right for their nationals to engage in
fishing in limited areas of the high seas adjacent to their coasts on an
exc7Jusive basis in the exceptional case in which that state is prin~arily
dependent upon its coastal fisheries for its economic livelihood.
Commentary

This principle is the antithesis of Principle I which recognizes the
basic right of all states to fish in the high seas. It is based upon a
recognition that in a few unusual and exceptional cases, the total
economy of the coastal state is so overwheln1ingly dependent upon its
coastal fisheries as to justify this extren1e departure from the three112
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century old principle of freedom of the high seas for fishing. This
dependence may be reflected in various ways, such as (a) the high
n1onetary value of the coastal fisheries catch in relation to the total
domestic production of the state, and (b) the high percentage of exports o:f fish products to total exports. Other tests could be devised to
detern1ine 'vhether the coastal state should be entitled to exclusive fishing r ights in limited areas of the high seas adjacent to its coasts.
These exclusive fishing areas for a few states in most, if not all, cases
ought to be narro,ver than those in 'vhich all other coastal states vvould
enjoy preferential fishing rights in order to provide for the minimum
encroaclunent on the basic principle (No. I) of freedom of fishing for
all states beyond a narrovv territorial sea.
It will be noted that specific breadths for the preferential zone and,
in exceptional cases, the exclusive zone, have not been suggested. This
omission was not inadvertent. Too often in the past attention has been
narrowly focused on the details of proposals to solve the coastal
fisheries p roblem (as well as the problem of delimiting the territorial
sea and other internation.allaw problems) vvithout first formulating a
broad theoretical concept which takes full, objective account o£ (a) the
vvorld community values at stake, (b) the conditions in the world
vvhich suggest possible alternative courses of action in order to maximize those values for the greatest number of states, and (c) the possible effects of alternative courses of action.
For the above reason, the emphasis here has been upon the formulation of a set of principles, vvide-spread adoption of which it is sublnitted would constitute a long step toward underwriting an equitable
and just solution of the coastal fisheries problem.
( l) Summary and Conclusion

Under the three complementary principles set forth above, the tvvo
providing for (a) preferential, and (b) in exceptional cases, exclusi1;e
fishing rights in limited areas of the high seas adjacent to coastal
states vvould novv fully recognize the economic and social conditions
vvhich underlie the e1nerging demands of states vvith respect to their
coastal fisheries. Admittedly these tvvo nevv principles constitute a
significant departure from the traditional, universally-recognized
principle of freedo1n o:f fishing in the high seas vvhich was most recently incorporated in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.
It is vvorthy o:f special note here that, by contrast vvith the other three
Conventions drafted at the same time, the Convention on the High
Seas boldly begins by saying, "The States parties to this Convention,
desiring to codify. the rules of international lww relating to the high
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seas . . . have agreed as follo-ws. ... '' 114 Thereaft er, in A r ticle 2, t he
Convent ion enumerates some of the freedoms of the high seas, the second of which is "freedom of fishing." Thus, this Convention r eaffirms
the univer sal recognition of the basic principle of freedom of the seas
for fishing as 'vell as for other purposes.
Not only ·would the t'vo new principles recognize preferential and
exclusive fish ing rights in limited areas of the high seas for the first
time, but, p erhaps more importantly, such rights 'vould be r ecognized
apart lro1n the qu·es'tion oI the delimitation oI the territorial sea.
It 'vill be re1nembered from the previous discussion th at t he F irst
Committee of the Conference proposed the incorporation into the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of an article
providing for an exclusive fishing zone. This recent action by an international conference on the law of the sea in attempting t o keep the
coastal fisheries problem inextricably linked 'vith the question o:f delimiting the territorial sea followed the customary but, thus f ar, un successful joint (and muddled) approach to the solution of t'vo
diverse p r oblems. It is now proposed that these two proble1ns be
separated .and that the coastal fisheries problem be resolved under the
three complementary principles which would balance the equities be- t'veen coastal and overseas fishing states.
Many years ago Professor Riesenfeld, a distinguished scholar, r ecognized that "rightly or wrongly, the question of coastal fisheries is
closely bound up with the international la'v of terr itorial
'vaters . . . . " 115 Our analysis leads to the firm conviction that the
t'vo questions have been wrongly bound for too long a time.
It is hoped that the establishment of the three complementary principles enunciated above, detailed articles for which could be hamInered out in an international conference dealing with coastal fisheries
alone, will make it possible to solve t'vo of the most impor t ant problems of the law of the sea in our time: (a) the problem of the p recise
delimitat ion of the territorial sea 'vith its overriding maritime and security aspects, and (b) the problem of fishing rights of coast al states.

F. THE NEED FOR A NARROW TERRITORIAL SEA : THE
UNITED STATES AND FREE WORLD PERSPECTIVE
We turn now to a more detailed examination of the reasons 'vhy it
is imperative from the perspective of the United States and the rest of
the Free World to have as narrow a territorial sea as possible and
hence the maximum freedom of the high seas for utilization by all
inclusive users.
114
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But first it 'vill be helpful to revie\v briefly the four principal reasons why many states favor an extension of the territorial sea :fron1
the present three miles to as much as 200 n1iles.
l. Principal Reasons Why Many States Favor An Extension of
The Territorial Sea

(a) First and foremost is the desire on the part of several coastal
fishing states to achieve an extension of their exclusive fishing rights
through the blanket device o:f extending the territorial sea. It \vill be
remembered that in some instances, particularly in the case of certain
South American countries which claim that their only purpose is conservation of fisheries, it has been asserted that the territorial sea is
not being extended. Yet this puzzling disa vo\val hardly coincides
either with the language of the decrees which have claimed sovereignty
over a wide belt o:f high seas,116 or with the actual practice o:f excluding
overseas fishing vessels or fining them for fishing within 200 miles o:f
the coast, and even beyond that distance. 117
The device of a blanket extension of the territorial sea as a means
of achieving an increase in the area of exclusive fishing rights is understandable from the limited perspective o:f the coastal fishing interests
and as a manifestation of an unfortunate and narrow national egoism.
However, as shown above, it is possible :for the needs of all fishing
states, coastal as well as overseas, to be fulfilled on an equitable basis
by the separation o:f the coastal fisheries problem from the question
6
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and crew. (Public Law 680, 27 August 1954, Chapte·r 25) ; MacChesney, op. cit.,
footnote 23 (at 436).
].1

117
of the breadth of the territorial sea and the concurrent establish1nent
of three broad complementary princi pies : ( 1) freedom of fishing on
the high seas, ( 2) preferential fishing r ights of the coastal state in
limited areas adjacent to the coast, and ( 3) exclusive fishing rights o:f
the coastal state in li1nited areas adjacent to the coast in a few exceptional cases. 118
(b) Second is the desire on the part o£ so1ne states, particularly
many newly independent states, to reject the three-mile limit because
o£ the association of that limit vvith the large vvestern maritime
powers vv ho, in some cases, ·were the former colonial In asters o:f the
nevv states. Several of these states constituted an Afro-Asian group
at the Conference. An equally strong psychological reason for rejecting the three-mile limit in favor of a wider breadth, which also
lacks justification from a rational, long-run perspective, is what might
be described as "keeping up 'vith one's neighbors." Early evidence
of this reason for favoring an extension of the territorial sea was
indicated in the forthright statement of Mr. Spiropoulos, the distinguished delegate from Greece, in the debate in the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly prior to the opening of the Geneva.
Conference,
"The breadth of Greece's territorial sea at present is six n1iles
I an1 going to tell you a secret, which I hope you will forget
when you leave this room. We did not want a six-mile limit;
we felt no need for it; but vve were surrounded by States
which, even at the time of The Hague Conference, were
insisting on a six-mile limit. Obviously, Greece could not retain the three-mile rule when neighbouring States were claiming six miles. I repeat, my Government is ready to accept
any solution which will promote the freedom of the high
seas. We are prepared to waive our present six-mile limit
and accept a lower limit. Nevertheless, if neighbouring
States extend their territorial sea to a breadth of twelve
1niles, Greece will have no choice but to follow suit.'' 119
(c) Third is the desire of the Soviet bloc to extend the territorial
sea to twelve miles obstensibly :for "security" reasons but actually to
advance their belligerent interests 120 and to increase the effectiveness
of their submarines, particularly during 'vartime. In this regard,
~fr. Dean, head of the United States delegation to the Geneva Conference, has written, in line with arguments he presented at the Conference, of the unjustifiable advantages a belligerent could gain from
a widespread extension of the territorial sea.
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"A n extension of the territorial sea of neutr al nations would
dr amatically increase the striking po,ver of enen1y submarines. Submarines normally oper ate 'vith considerable .
difficulty and 'vith 1nuch risk under 'vater " . ithin three miles
f rom shore but their freedom of movement is greatly increased bet,veen three and t'velve miles. If t he territorial
sea 'vere extended to twelve miles, an enemy sub1narine,
particularly one 'vith atomic pow·er which might <;>perate f or
long periods 'vithout surfacing, could operate possibly undetected under w·at ers in a neutral state's territorial sea. But
our surface ships could not operate on the surface of these
'vaters 'vithin the territorial sea 'vithout risking charges of
violating such state's neutrality. An extension of the terr itorial sea to twelve miles might thus n1ake an enemy fleet
of subn1arines, capable of discharging missiles from near t he
coast, practically inviolable while operating under ·water in
t he t erritorial seas.'; 121
That this rather obvious, though unstated, reason for the Soviet
bloc's rejection of the Free "\Vorld sponsored three-mile limit (and
to a lesser extent the Afro-Asian group's similar rejection and advoeacy of a twelve-mile limit), 'vas for the purpose of seriously crippling t he n avies of the United States and her allies is borne out by
the p enet rat ing observation of Professor Sorensen, Chairman of the
D anish delegation,
"The emphasis (by the United States) on military considerations naturally had the effect of strengthening opposit ion to the three-mile rule by those states, belonging to the
Soviet as 'vell as to the Afro-Asian group, 'vhich are antagonistic to the naval supremacy of the Western po,vers." 122
(d) Fourth is the desire of certain Arab states to sup port a
twelve-mile limit primarily for the purpose of preventing Israel fron1
having an outlet to the "high seas" of the Gulf of Aqaba. 123
A complete list of the reasons 'vhy it is imperative to have as narrow a territorial sea as possible, at least from the perspective of the
United States and her allies would include an enumer~ation of all
major objectives of the Free World such as po,ver, wealth, enlightenment, well-being and so forth, achieved through democratic proc121
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esses.1 24 For our purposes, ho,vever , it 1n ay be \vell to focus
attention on \vhat might be categorized as 1nilitary and economic
reasons f or a narrow territorial sea.1 25
124

McDougal a nd B urke, op. ci t. , f oot note 25 (at 549- 550) . The general
objectives enumerated by :McDouga l a nd B u r k e are worth listing here:
''OBJECTIVES
The objectives sought by claima nt states embrace all the ch a r acteristic de
1nands of the nation-state for the protection and enhancen1ent of its bases of
power as such demands are projected upon the oceans a nd include also the
various pa rticular demands w hich sta tes habitua lly put f orward on beh a lf of
the other, nongovernmental participan ts. In brief su mmary, some of the m ore
significant of these manifold changing objectives n1ay be· related to certain
general value categories.
"P ower is sought by states in advancing claims t o con t r ol access to their
own territ orial base, to secure effective and economical a ccess t o the territorial
bases of ot hers and t o share in the establishment a nd a d m inistration of a
stable public order of the oceans. In time of war, of course, belligerent s ta t es
seek to obtain command of the sea or to deny it to the enemy in order t o
interdict enemy commerce and to m a ke his use of the sea for communication
as costly as possible.
"Wealth may be seen as a goal in the great congeries of claims relating to
transportation, navigation, fishing and mineral exploitation. One may observe
demands both to limit access to territorial base resources and markets and to
foster ease of access to distant resources and markets..
"Enlightenment is pursued as a 1najor goal in atte1npts to preserve the sea a s
a locale for conducting scientific research and exploration and as a cheap and
efficient means of transportation and conununication, affording access no t only
to the homeland but to the whole globe for the acquisition of new knowledge.
"Well-being is a fundan1ental objective in the variety of claims directed t oward
prevention of plagues and preservation of health, and in certain claims t o fishery
exploitation.
"Respect is sought in the efforts of a claimant to secure access as a n equal
participant, free from discrimination, in all the power-enhancing and wealthproducing activities of the world which have special reference to the use of the
oceans. The enormous importance attached to fleets, control of ports and the
display of flags, as symbols of status, is commonplace.
"Skill has been a traditional objective of states in seeking to assure through
use of the oceans and access to the experience of others a reservoir of trained
maritime and other personnel for purposes of both war and peace.
"Solidarity-primary and large group attachments--is embodied in demands
which emphasize the oceans as means of promoting broader identification of
peoples by providing a focus for organization of transnational loyalties and
common sentiment, as in the North Atlantic community.
"Rectitude appears as a goal in attempts to reconcile many varying conceptions of right and wrong from many different cultures, both in a law of the sea
and in other standards, for the promotion of co-operative activity."
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2. Military Reaso ns for a Narrow Territorial Se a

The United States and most of the other countries of the Free
vVorld comprise an oceanic confederation. Since a majority of the
states of the F ree vVorld bloc, as well as some important neutral states,
are maritime states, their security is dependent upon the mobility and
flexibility of their o·vvn and United States naval forces and merchant
fleets. It 1nust be emphasized that the Free World bloc is interdependent; no one of the states-not even the United States as powerful as she is-can stand alone against either the hot or cold war
designs, probings, and pressures of Con1munist states, particularly the
Soviet Union.
Inasmuch as the Free World states, including not only coastal states
but land-locked states as well, are so interdependent both for security
and economic development, the lifelines which bind them together
are the sea lanes through which effective military forces may be
deployed and war materiel and econon1ic goods transported whenever
a Communist coup appears imminent.
At the present time the Free World countries as a group have a
decided advantage both as na,v al 126 and commercial maritime
powers. 127
Since the United States Navy and merchant fleets and the navies
and n1erchant fleets of the rest of the Free World are major instruJane's Fight ing Ships, 70 (1959-60) ; Brassey's Annual, "The Armed Forces
Year-Book," passim (1958).
127
JJferchant Fleets of the World (as of Dec. 31, 1958), U.S. Maritiine Administration. The rankings of the first twelve states at the end of 1958 were as
follows ( Ib id., 2 ) :
DEADWEIGHT
RANK
STATE
TONS
1 United States--------------------------------------------- 33,653,000
2 United Kingdom __________________________________________ 24, 372, 000
126

3 Liberia -------------------------------------------------- 17, 790, 000
4 Nor,vay -------------------------------------------------- 14,142,000
5 Japan--------------------------------------------------- 7,723,000
6 Panama-------------------------------------------------- 6,609,000
7 Italy ---------------------------------------------------- 6,503,000
8 West GermanY-------------------------------------------- 5,660,000
9 The Netherlands----------------------------------~------- 5,46~000
10 France -------------------------------------------------- 5,398,000
11 Sweden-------------------------------------------------- 4,751,000
12 U.S.S.R. ------------------------------------------------- 3,809,000
(Note: The above publication appears to be in error at 15 in saying that
Denmark "ranked twelfth among the maritime nations of the world." At the
end of 1958 Denmark had only 2,745,000 deadweight tons of merchant fleet
which is less than that for the U.S.S.R. even if one deducts from the figure
given above (3,809,000) the 785,000 deadweight tons of lend-lease vessels.)
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n1ents in preserving world peace, and since the effectiveness of these
navies and merchant fleets depends so much upon the maximum freedoin of the high seas for unrestricted and unfettered navigation, it is
imperative that the territorial seas of the world be kept to a minimum.
It has already been noted that an extension of the territorial sea from
three to six miles would mean that more than fifty international straits
which are now· high seas would become territorial seas, and an extension from three to twelve miles would mean that more than one
hundred international straits which are no'v high seas would become
territorial seas. 128
While it is true that under the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone warships as well as merchant ships have the right
of innocent passage, and while this right rna y not be suspended in
international straits even temporarily by the coastal state either under
provisions of the Convention/ 29 or under the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case,I 30 "passage" as de~
fined in the Convention is limited to the specific purpose of traversing
the sea. 131
Moreover, the coastal state may impose regulations on navigation
through its territorial sea and even suspend passage temporarily in
such waters (other than in straits) if such suspension "is essential
:for the protection of its security." 132 Therefore, the navies and merchant fleets of the Free World would have far less mobility and far
:fewer rights in the extended area of the territorial seas beyond three
miles than they now have when those waters are high seas.
It must be emphasized again and again that the right of freedom
of navigation on the high seas is a greater right than the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea of a coastal state. The
former right (i.e., freedom of navigation on the high seas) is the
right to use a common resource subject only to (a) the general obligation to accommodate other inclusive users, and (b) any self-imposed
specific obligation resulting from a treaty. The latter right (i.e.,
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea) is a limited
right to use an exclusive rather than a common resource over which
the coastal state has sovereignty. In its exercise of sovereignty the
128

See discussion, supra, p. 90. For a brief geographical and hydrographical
study of some of the major straits which constitute routes for international
traffic, see U.N. Preparatory Document No.6 (A/CONF. 13/6 and Add. 1 (1957)),
mimeographed, and also printed in I Official Records (A/CONF. 13/37, 114-164
(1958)).
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coastal state may issue rules and regulations governing the "passage"
through its territorial sea and may, under proper conditions, even
suspend such passage (i.e., the right of innocent passage is subject
to divestment). It follows that the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea, while by no means a second-class right, is not the
equivalent of the right to navigate freely on the high seas. Therefore, it is imperative that the area of the high seas be kept to the
maximum and the breadth of the territorial sea be kept as narrow
as possible.
Moreover, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the military
air forces and the commercial air fleets of the Free World, which are
also a vital deterrent to the spread of Communism, would be even
more hampered by an extension of the territorial sea beyond the
three-mile limit than would be true of the navies and merchant fleets
of the Free World for the reason that the right of innocent passage
does not apply to the airspace above the territorial sea.. As ~{r. Dean
has said,
"There is no right for aircraft to overfly another nation's
territorial sea except under a treaty, with its consent, or pursuant to the Chicago Civil Aviation Convention of 1944 as
to the contracting parties thereto." 133
It is unfortunate that international law at present does not accord
to aircraft the same right of innocent passage to overfly the territorial
sea as warships and merchant vessels have to navigate thereon, except,
of course, \vhere control or exclusion of foreign aircraft is necessary (
for security reasons. The United 1\::ingdom in its compromise proposal to extend the territorial sea to six miles inserted a provision
\Vhich would have kept the airspace above the outward three miles
free :for aircraft to overfly as though it were airspace above high
seas. 134 While this provision was laudable as an effort to keep the
airspace as free as possible for unrestricted flight, it failed to achieve
much support.
It should be emphasized that the increased mobility and flexibility
which a narrow territorial sea gives to the navies and the air :forces of
the Free World does not mean that the striking force o:f these defense
components will have to be used to deter the spread o£ communism.
Indeed, the deterrent effect often results from the mere presence and ,
display of the navies and air forces. vVitness, for example, the de133
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terrent effect of the presence of the United States Seventh Fleet in the
defense of the Nationalist Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and
the stabilizing influence of the United States Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean.
While it is true that the deterrent effect of a display of :force in a
given area of the world is difficult to measure, largely because it is
psychological, the Free World should strive unceasingly to retain
whatever advantage is derived :from such display. To do this, it
would be highly desirable to retain the present three-mile limit; it
is imperative that the Free World not agree to an extension of the
territorial sea beyond six miles. One reason is clear: ships and aircraft may be identified visually, though not well, at six miles. However, at twelve miles it is not possible to see an aircraft with the
naked eye, nor to identify even large warships. Hence, the deterrent
effect and stabilizing influence o:f a display of naval :force in a
trouble-area of the world where a three-mile territorial sea exists
would be reduced by at least 50% if the limit were extended to six
miles; it would be reduced to nil with a 12-mile territorial sea.
Finally, one may include among the military reasons why the
territorial sea should be kept as narrow as possible-preferably a
three-mile limit but in all events not more than six miles-the fact
that as the territorial sea becomes wider the problems of neutral states
become greater. Far too often states tend to think o:f their rights
in the territorial sea (i.e., sovereignty, exclusive fishing, etc.) and
:forget their corollary duties. These duties involve both economic
considerations, such as the cost of installing and maintaining navigational aids, (see below) and military considerations.
From the military standpoint, if a neutral state is to maintain its
neutrality in order to avoid the cost in lives and property of becoming
embroiled in belligerency, it is necessary for it to patrol its territorial
sea. The wider the territorial sea, the larger the patrol fleet which
would be required. Conversely, the narrower the territorial sea the
smaller the patrol fleet and the less chance of inadvertent involvement
jn the belligerency.
If the small maritime states o:f the world, particularly those with
strategic coastlines and strong desires to remain neutra1 in a possible
conflict between other states, would weigh carefully the added burdens and risks which any extension of the territorial sea would impose upon their neutrality, it is firmly believed that they would line
up solidly in :favor of a retention of the three-mile limit. The exercise of sovereignty over the territorial sea is a responsibility and
a risk as .well as a right. Minimization of the risk is not achieved,
nor withdrawal from risk enhanced, when the area of the' risk is
enlarged.
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3. Economic Reasons for a Narrow Territorial Sea

In addition to the increased cost of patrolling an extended territorial
sea by a netural state to insure conformance with the requirements
of neutrality, the additional costs of installing and maintaining navigational aids if the territorial sea were extended from three to six
or twelve miles would prove to be a serious financial burden for
many states, particularly those which are relatively poor economically.
It is estimated that the United States would _require an expenditure of several million dollars plus a substantial increase in annual
operating costs of more than a n1.illion dollars for each 100 miles of
coastline if the territorial sea were extended from three to twelve
miles. In addition, burdensome expenditures would have to be made
for navigational aids and to change the charts, maps, and manuals
which mariners must use. Of course, the initial expenditures and
added financial expense required per mile of coastline would vary
throughout the world 2 depending upon the geomorphological conditions. But, it is clear that for all maritime states, especially for
the small, economically underdeveloped ones, the additional cost of
an extended territorial sea would prove financially burdensome.
In addition to the increased economic burdens on the coastal state
as indicated above, an extension of the territorial sea would increase
the cost of transporting goods and people. Landlocked states as well
as coastal states would suffer from these increased costs.
Despite the recognized right of innocent passage of vessels through
the territorial sea, the movement of goods and people both by surface
vessels and aircraft would be adversely affected by an extension of the
territorial sea. New, longer, and in many cases more hazardous routes
would have to be developed in order to a void the hampering regulations which some coastal states would undoubtedly i1npose upon vessels using their extended territorial seas.
As the chairman of the United States delegation to the United
Nations Conference has said,
"The operation of commercial shipping on, or commercial
aircraft over, water would also be greatly handicapped,
slowed down and subjected to interminable delays. Indeed,
it would seem to have been part of the Russian purpose in
backing extensions of the territorial sea so to hamper the
commerce of the free world as a part of its saud-in-the-gearbox technique. . . The right and ability of merchant ships
carrying goods and passengers to schedule the most economical passage possible between ports, to enter and leave harbors
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freely, and to move on the surface of the water without ininterruption or delay would be jeojardized." 135
Inasmuch as the cost of all movement of goods and people by ships
and aircraft must be borne eventually by the recipients of the goods
and services, the impediments to such commerce and transportation
and the added risks thereof resulting from an extension of the territorial sea 'vould be reflected in higher costs. These incr eased costs
'vould represent an unnecessary economic waste and r esult in a fur ther shackling of international trade at a time 'vhen one of the great
needs of the world is to facilitate the free flow of goods and people.
It is seldom realized that the 'vorld's ocean commer ce accounts for
more than three quarters of the total tonnage of goods exchanged
among states. 136 To advocate an increase in the already heavy bur dens on that commerce by extending the territorial sea from the
present three-mile limit to, say, t'velve miles, is to take t emporary
leave from one's common sense.
It may be concluded that both for military and economic r easons it
is imperative from the perspective of the United States and the rest of
the Free World that the territorial sea be kept as narrow as possible,
preferably at the present three-n1ile limit, or at most extended to not
over a six-mile limit. 137
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'Vere it not for the fact that the concept of a territorial sea is so firmly
established in international law (albeit with widely disputed origin), and given
an equitable solution to the coastal fisheries proble1n along the lines indicated
above, it might be argued that the "territorial sea" be abolished entirely from
international law.
Many readers may gasp at this suggestion, and perhaps even recoil from the
thought of pulling a state's boundaries back to the shoreline a nd abandoning a
concept so venerable as the "territorial sea." Yet, a little sober reflection will
lead to the unassailable conclusion that one of the primary reasons for the
development of the concept, particularly during the 19th century, no longer has
any real validity. Security of a coastal state against attack from the sea has
been one of the foremost reasons why a state needed to extend its boundaries
from the shoreline to encompass a narrow band of waters. Shore batteries could
keep an invading force away from the coasts, and foreign nav;al vessels beyond
the three-mile limit could not bombard the ports and military installations with
their limited-range naval guns. Today, in an era of intercontinental ballist ic
missiles and other advanced (and rapidly advancing) weaponry, which makes
it possible for submarines to fire missiles while submerged several hundred
miles at sea, the need for a territorial sea of three, six or even t welve miles a s
security against attack is meaningless.
'Vhile it is still true that a coastal state needs some way to control access
to its shores and the ocean and air traffic in the area immediately adjacent
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ADDENDUM

The above chapter was written prior to the convening of the second
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva, March
1960. For a discussion of the results of this Convention see Appendix
N.
thereto for a variety of purposes, including security against attack and the prevention of infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, sanitary and other
regulations, it is not necessary to have a territorial sea for this purpose. In
fact, the inadequacy of the territorial sea for accomplishing such purposes is
what led to the development of continguous zones, some of which extend out
several hundred miles (e.g., the Air Defense Identification Zone for aircraftADIZ).

